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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
GAMBLING TODAY VIA THE "FREE REPLAY"
PINBALL MACHINE
I. INTRODUCTION
The terms "gambling" and "gaming" as used today have a meaning
notorious, and generally in the United States,' a sanction is found an-
nexed to these words in statutory and judicial pronouncements. Pho-
netically, the fundamental word from which these derivatives issued was
an old Anglo-Saxon term, "gamen", which originally was defined as
"pleasure, sport",2 but shortly thereafter took on the meaning of "to
play".3 In modern legal parlance, the expression "gambling" consists
of three elements; the payment of a price or consideration for a chance
to gain a prize.4
The practice of gambling appears to have its origin in a psycho-
logical stimulus inherent in human nature generally, and thus, the
natural development of gambling among the most primitive peoples,
and its perseverance throughout history is explained.5 The chance of
acquiring a greater reurn by risking a lesser value was an inducement
to various forms of gaming among the ancient Egyptians, Chinese and
Japanese, the Hebrews, the Greeks and Romans, and the early Ger-
manic Tribes.6 In England, gambling with dice dates back to the ad-
vent of the Saxons, Danes, and the Romans.7
II. ANTI-GAMBLING LEGISLATION
Attempts were made to restrict gambling quite early in English
history; one of the first being an edict issued jointly by Richard the
First of England and Philip of France, in 1190, for the regulation of
the Christian Army during the Crusade." This edict is typical of the
'Nevade alone seems to be the only jurisdiction in the United States not now
prohibiting gambling. In Nevada Tax Comm. v. Hicks, 310 P.2d 852 (Nev.
1957), that state's court recognized its unique position when it said: "We note
that while gambling, duly licensed, is a lawful enterprise in Nevada, it is
unlawful elsewhere in the country, .... "
2 ASHTON, THE HISTORY OF GAMBLING IN ENGLAND, (1898).
3Ibid. See also Foley v. Whelan, 219 Minn. 209, 17 N.W.2d 367 ( ).
4 Westerhaus Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 165 Ohio St. 327, 135 N.W.2d 318 (1956)
Boies v, Bartell, 82 Ariz. 217, 310 P. 2d 834 (1957) ; State v. One "Jack and
Jill" Pinball Machine, 224 S.W. 2d 854 (Mo. App. 1949).
5 ASHTON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 2.
6 ASHTON, op. cit. supra note 2, pp. 3-12. The author demonstrates the exist-
ence of gambling in 1600 B.C. by the Egyptians at 3.
7 ASHTON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 12. The Roman Period from 55 B.C. to
409 A.D. was followed by the Anglo-Saxon influx beginning about 449 A.D.,
and the period of the Danes' control started in 1017 A.D.
8 ASHTON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 13. The edict prohibited any person in the
army, beneath the degree of knight, from playing at any sort of game for
money: knights and clergymen might play for money, but none of them were
permitted to lose more than twenty shillings in one whole day and night, under
a penalty of one hundred shillings, to be paid to the archbishops in the army.
While the monarchs could play for what they pleased, their attendants were
limited to the sum of twenty shillings also, and if this ceiling were exceeded,
violaors were to be whipped naked through the army for three days.
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subsequent statutes in England in the fact that gambling was prohibited
selectively; gaming by certain classes of persons,9 or at certain times'
being forbidden. The Statute 33 Henry VIII c.9, of 1542, repealed
the various earlier statutes, and therein consolidated the law on the
subject.:" However, in and of itself, gambling was not a crime at
Common Law, unless it fell within the provisions of a special statute,
or when it was a nuisance, tended to immorality or breach of the peace,
was against public policy for any reason, or was conducted by fraudu-
lent means.12
In the United States, statutes suppressing gambling, and providing
for the confiscation of gambling devices appeared early and have al-
most without exception been upheld as valid under the police power of
the States, 3 or under Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce
respectively.' 4 The social policy behind the legislation against engaging
in gambling seems to be made explicit in Marvin v. Trout,"5 where the
United States Supreme Court stated:
"It is well settled that the police power of the state may be
exerted to preserve and protect the public morals. It may regu-
late or prohibit any practice or business, the tendency of which,
as shown by experience, is to weaken or corrupt the habits of
those who follow it, or to encourage idleness instead of habits of
industry. Whether or not gambling is demoralizing in its ten-
dencies is no longer an open question. Gambling is injurious to
the morals and welfare of the people, and it is not only within
the scope of the state's police power to suppress gambling in all
its forms, but it is its duty to do so."
The extent to which even apparently innocent'gambling is involved in
organized crime is strikingly illustrated by a perusal of the reports of
the current Senate Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or
Management Field.'6
9 ASHTON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 13. The Statute of 24 Henry III, A.D. 1351,
prohibited the clergy from playing at dice and chess. See also United States
v. Dixon, 4 Cranch (C.C.) 107 (D.C. 1830), for a complete analysis of this
discriminatory legislation in England.
'0 ASHTON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 14. 8 Edward III, A.D. 1334, forbade play-.
ing at dice during the Feast of Christmas. See also United States v. Dixon,
supra note 9.
11 United States v. Dixon, supra note 10.
2 Ibid.; United States v. Willis, Fed. Cas. No. 16,728, 1 Cranch (C.C.) 511 (D.C.
1808). See also Am. & ENG. ENCY. (2d ed. 1899) p. 666, citing the English case
of Bell v. Norwich, 3 Dyer 254b.
'3 Farr v. O'Keefe, 27 F.Supp. 216 (D.C. Miss. 1939); Albright v. 2uncrief, 206
Ark. 319, 176 S.W.2d 426 (1943) ; United States v. 65 Slot Machines, 102 F.
Supp. 922 (D.C. La. 1952).
'4 United States v. 65 Slot Machines, supra note 13; United States v. Five Gam-
bling Devices, 119 F. Supp. 641 (D.C. 1954). These cases uphold the consti-
tutionality of a 1951 Federal Statute, 15 U.S.C.A. §1172 (Supp. 1956), which
prohibits interstate shipment of certain types of gambling devices.
15 199 U.S. 212 (1905).
16 Hearings before Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or
Management Field, (Senate) S. 74, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957), pts. 1-11.
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To complement and further effectuate the states' various anti-
gambling laws,"7 Congress in 1951 enacted into the Federal Code a
chapter prohibiting shipment of gambling devices in interstate com-
merce to any state not affirmatively exempting itself from the op-
eration of the Federal Statute.' s Construction of this section as ex-
tending federal power to prohibit and confiscate the devices to any
intrastate movement which interferes with, obstructs, or otherwise
directly affects interstate commerce or federal regulation thereof has
been recently affirmed ;19 so that there appears to be left no nebulous
area wherein a gambling device might escape confiscation, the states
being able to act where the apparatus remains stationary within it, or
where in intrastate transportation not directly affecting interstate com-
merce, and the federal government being able to act upon alternative
occurrences.
III. THE PINBALL MACHINE AS A GAMBLING DEVICE
Today, the pinball species of coin-operated slot machines, and many
of its various subspecies are familiar to most of the general public due
to the widespread installation of these devices in places of public
gathering and recreation areas. The typical example of this machine
could be described as a rectangular table, whose top surface is slanted
and contains differently valued apertures, toward which the operator
tries to direct a number of balls, initially by means of a plunger or
bar under tension. The object of the game is to attain the highest
score, or the right combination of numbers, symbols, figures, etc., for
which either nothing more is received, or anything from a mere addi-
tional play to a payoff in merchandise or money is awarded the player.
Although these games are seemingly trifling in their nature and object,
Testimony here indicates a tie-in between pinball and slot machine interests
and unusual union activity, and city, county and state officials in Oregon.
17 In Smith v. McGrath, 103 F. Supp. 286 (D.C. Md. 1952), the court stated:
"The main purpose of this chapter dealing with transportation of gambling
devices is to aid the states in local enforcement of anti-gambling laws by pro-
hibiting interstate transportation of such gambling devices ... "
's 15 U.S.C.A. §§1171-1177 (Supp. 1956); especially §1172 which declares: "It
shall be unlawful knowingly to transport any gambling device to any place in
a state, the District of Colombia, or possession of the United States, from any
place outside such state, the District of Columbia, or possession: provided that
this section shall not apply to transportation of any gambling device to a place
in any state which has enacted a law providing for the exemption of such state
from the provisions of this section, or to a place in any subdivision of a state
if the state in which such subdivision is located has enacted a law providing
for the exemption of such subdivision from the provisions of this section."
29 United States v. Denmark, 119 F.Supp. 647 (D.C. Ga. 1954), affd 74 S.Ct. 190
(1954); United States v. Seven Slot Machines and Gambling Devices, 119
F.Supp. 647 (D.C. Ga. 1954); United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 119
F.Supp. 641 (D.C. Ga. 1954). But note that these cases carefully stated that
purely intrastate activity of gambling devices, which had no direct affect on,
or did not interfere or obstruct interstate commerce, could not be so regulated
under Congress' power over interstate commerce.
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they are neither an insignificant part of gambling operations,20 nor is
the income derived therefrom unsatisfactory, 21 nor are the crimes con-
nected thereto inconspicuous. 22
From the prevalent dispersion of these machines, especially in ur-
ban areas, 23 and the various estimates of the income they produce, 24 it
is not unreasonable to view the pinball machine operation as a billion
dollar business which is quite unwilling to suspend its activities.25 In
New York, an investigation report on pinball operations concluded
that the social evils of pinball machines were the same as those pre-
sented by the now generally banned slot machines . 2  Quite recently
in Wisconsin, a bill2 before the State Legislature to permit pinball
machines which pay off with free games only was defeated by opposition
of law enforcement agencies which felt this would open the door for
the development of syndicate gambling in that state.2 8
Although the statutory definitions of "gambling device" differ
among the various states, the traditional elements of consideration,
2 0 Hearing, supra note 16; see also BLANCHE, FAcrS AND FALLACIES ABOUT
GAMBLING, 96, 97 (1949).
21 Hearings, supra note 16, pt. 1 at 224. There one Stanley G. Terry, a Portland,
Oregon, pinball machine operator conservatively estimated his annual income
from 200 of the devices to amount to $100,000, after a one-half split of the
-total amount with the owners of the locations where the machines were placed.
BLANCHE, op. cit. supra note 20, at 94, 95, places as his estimate of the
weekly total income of the machines from $50 to $350, depending upon the
volume of play, and the amount of "gimmicking" done to the machine to
guarantee more profit.
22Hearings, supra note 16, pt. 1 and 11. See also BLANCHE, Op. cit. supra, note
20 at 97, where various ways of corrupting law enforcement agencies and
officers are discussed.2 3 BLANCHE, op. cit. supra note 20 at 96. In 1941, New York City had a total
of 11,080 pinball machines operating, with more than this number of machines
sold in the city in the preceding year alone.
24 Ibid., at 94, 98. On page 98, the author states that New York City officials,
after a thorough investigation, estimated that in 1941 the annual average of
from 20 to 23 million dollars was being fed into that city's pinball machines.
See also note 21 supra.
25 BLANCHE, op. cit. supra note 20, at 96, 97, where methods of graft to be used
in the protection of the pinball business in California are listed as: "(1) the
payment of a flat sum periodically; (2) 'cutting in' public officers for a per-
centage of the operation; (3) heavy 'campaign contributions' both before and
after election. Ways and means were considered of removing various state
and local officers who are considered stumbling blocks in the way of the
'industry'."26Ibid., at 96. New York's Department of Investigation, headed by William B.
Herlands, prepared this report, entitled "Operation of Pin-Ball Machines in
New York City."
27 Bulletin of the Proceedinqs of the Wisconsin Legislature, Part II, Assembly,
Regular Session (1957), Week Ending September 14, 1957, No. 44A, p. 72.
Assembly Bill 44A was amended twice by the Assembly and twice by the
Senate before it failed due to the Senate's not concurring in it on June 28,
1957, one day before recess.28 The Common Council and the Police Department of the City of Milwaukee
vigorously opposed passage of this bill; such opposition undoubtedly stemming
from the disclosures of the McClellan Rackets Committee of the United States
Senate, noted as Hearings, supra note 16.
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chance and prize29 generally seem to be integrated into these statutes.30
There is little probability that the consideration element will be lack-
ing in the operation of the pinball machine, since the player must de-
posit a coin of some denomination to initiate the game in the first in-
stance. On the second component, the problem of skill versus chance
has arisen in respect to statutes which are not clear,31 or where statutes
spell out a "predomination" of one over the other.3 2 Many State stat-
utes32 and the Federal Statute34 specifically use the test of "an element
of chance" thus stifling conflict on this point; however even where not
explicit, the judicial construction has reached the same result.3 With
few exceptions, 36 pinball games have been found to be games of
chance ;37 the test being whether or not chance is involved when the
machine is played by the general public, or an average player, and not
when operated by a particularly practiced individual.3 s The third
_ See note 4 supra.
30 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §945.01 (3), (1955): "A gambling machine is a con-
trivance which for a consideration affords the player an opportunity to obtain
something of value the award of which is determined by chance, even though
accompanied by some skill, and whether or not the prize is automatically paid
by the machine."
15 U.S.C.A. §1171 (a) (2) (Supp. 1956): "Gambling Device-Any machine or
mechanical device designed and manufactured to operate by means of insertion
of a coin, token or similar object and designed and manufactured so that when
operated it will deliver as the result of the application of an element of chance,
any money or property."
31 Boies v. Bartell, 82 Ariz. 217, 310 P.2d 834 (1957), predominant chance being
the test; City of Milwaukee v. Burns, 255 Wis. 296, 38 N.W.2d 700 (1937), and
State v. Jaskie, 245 Wis. 398, 14 N.W.2d 148 (1944), using predomination of
skill as the test; Steely v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 554, 164 S.W.2d 977 (1942),
element of chance being where outcome depended less on the skill of the
player, than on accidental circumstances.
32See 135 A.L.R. 105: ". . . questions of skill, chance or mixed skill and chance
usually arise where such language is in the constitution, statutes, or ordinances."
3 See, e.g.: CAL. PEN. CODE §330 b (1), (Deering Supp. 1957), "any element
of hazard or chance"; IOWA CODE ANN. §726.5 (1950), "an element of
chance"; MICH. STAT. ANN. §28.535 (1954), "game of skill or chance or
partly of skill and partly of chance"; OHIO REV. CODE c. 29, §2915.15
(Page, 1954), "as a result of the application of an element of chance"; WIS.
STAT. §945.01 (3), (1955), "by chance, even though accompanied by some
skill."
34 15 U.S.C.A. §1171 (a) (2), (Supp. 1956), "... an element of chance .
3 See, eg., State ex rel. Dussault v. Kilburn, 111 Mont. 400, 109 P.2d 1113 (1941).
30 Deeb v. Stoutamire, 53 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1951), where sufficient skill was found
in a "Bowling" type pinball game to permit it, in spite of that state's "an ele-
ment of chance" test. In Wisconsin, the interpretation of the Attorney General,
41 Atty Gen. 111 (1954), was that a bowling-shuffleboard pinball machine was a
game of skill, and not a gambling device, although it dispensed coupons re-
deemable in merchandise.
3 State v. Paul, 43 N.J. Super. 396, 128 A.2d 737 (1957) ; Westerhaus Co. v. City
of Cincinnati, 165 Ohio St. 327, 135 N.W.2d 318 (1956) ; State v. Jackie, 245
Wis. 398, 14 N.W.2d 148 (1944) ; and in State ex rel. Dussault v. Kilburn, 111
Mont. 400, 109 P.2d 1113 (1941) where the court felt that chance outweighed
skill in the ordinary use of the pinball device: "Though evidence shows that a
certain degree of skill can be attained through long practice, pinball machines
as viewed by the average player or user contain an element of chance which
far outweighs that of skill."
38 State ex rel. Dussault v. Kilburn, supra note 37; Club 400 v. State ex rel.
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element, that of a prize, is usually the prime factor in determining the
illegality of the pinball as a gambling device. However, an extreme
minority of states regard the prize element as being immaterial to classi-
fication of the machine as acceptable or not.39 What a prize consists
of is ordinarily set out in the state statutes, and though differing in
form, the basic categories specified are money,40 property,41 thing of
value42 and sometimes goods, merchandise, 43 allowance or credit.44 To-
Thetford, 78 So. 2d 819 (Ala. App. 1955); BLANCHE, op. cit. supra note 20
at 95, estimates that at most skill constitutes but 10 per cent in the operation
of the game.
39 A few jurisdictions hold all pinball machines are gambling devices per se, and
the fact that no prize of any kind is awarded is not even considered. In
Stanley v. State, 194 Ark. 483, 107 S.W.2d 532 (1937), the court was of the
opinion that such devices should be banned because ". . . the only possible use
was as a game of chance." Alexander v. Hunnicutt, 196 S.C. 364, 13 S.E.2d
630 (1941), determined that even though played only for entertainment, with-
out any prize, it was a gambling device if the element of chance was involved
in its operation. However Tennessee apparently has taken the other extreme
of allowing pinball machines regardless of a prize being connected thereto. In
a 1957 statutory amendment, TENN. CODE ANN. §39-2033 (2) (4), (Heartly
Supp. 1957), "pinball machines" are excluded from the "valuable thing" test
of the anti-gambling statute, contrary to the originally proposed amendment
which exempted only those pinballs offering merely an immediate right to
replay. It would seem that here a prize given in the pinball machine category
would be inconsequential in determining the illegality of such devices. But
cf. Gayer v. Whelan, 59 Cal. App.2d 255, 138 P.2d 763, inodified, 60 Cal. App.2d
616, 141 P. 2d 514 (1943) ; Stirling Distributors, Inc. v. Keenan, 135 N.J.Eq.
508, 39 A.2d 79 (1944); Brafford v. Calhoun, 72 Ohio App. 920, 51 N.E2d
920 (1943); Commonwealth v. Mihalow, 142 Pa. Super. 433, 16 A.2d 656(1940) ; all expressing the majority view that ipso facto the pinball machine
without a prize is not a gambling device.
40 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§39-2001, 39-2006 (1955), "money or other
valuable thing." This is the most common statutory provision.
4' See, e.g., ARK. STAT. §41-2003 (1947), "money or property"; C. REV. STAT.
§40-10-9 (1953), "money or other property"; and the Federal Statute, 15
U.S.C.A. §1171 (b), "money or property."
4 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §945.01 (3), "something of value." Most state statutes
include this definition of prize, using the words "thing of value", "valuable
thing", "representative of value", "something of value". Some of the states
in this group are: Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13432 (1956); Con-
necticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. §8655 (1949); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, §666 (1953); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. §26-6404 (1953); Illinois,
ILL. ANN. STAT. c.38, §342 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1955); Indiana, IND.
STAT. ANN. §10-2330 (Burns 1956); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. §2190(1942); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:112-2 (1953); New Mexico,
N.M. STAT. ANN. §40-22-1 (1953); New York, N.Y. PEN. LAW §982, subd.
l(a,-b), 2, (1953); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE c.29 §2915.15 (Page 1954);
Oregon, ORE. REV. STAT. §167.505 (1955); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18 §4603 (Purdon 1945); South Carolina, S.C. CODE §1301 (1942);
South Dakota, S.D. CODE §24.0204 (1939); Texas, ANN. TEX. STAT. 1A§619 (Vernon 1957); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. §§39-2001. 39-2006(1955); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §76-27-1 (1953); Vermont, VT. STAT.§8558 (1951); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE §9.47 (1953); Wyoming,
WYO. COMP. STAT. §9-818 (1945).
43 See State v. Waite, 156 Kan. 143, 131 P.2d 708 (1942), interpreting these terms
as respecting definitions of a prize.
44 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13432 (1956), "checks, credits"; CAL.
PEN. CODE §330 b (Deering Supp. 1957), "credit, allowance"; VA. CODE
§18-292 (1950), "credit, allowance."
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day, in most jurisdictions, the courts have found that any tangible
award given or offered a successful player 45 will be a sufficient prize
to place the pinball machine in the prohibited class of gambling de-
vices. 6 The development of ever stricter legislation in this field has
been spurred by the resourcefulness of the slot machine interests in
promoting devices which technically did not offer the type of prize
prohibited by the then effective statutes, and substituting as induce-
ment something just a little different for the payoff.4 7 The Court in
Moberly v. Deskin48 recognized these attempts to avoid the law's intent,
and referring thereto stated:
"In no field of reprehensible endeavor has the ingenuity of
man been more exerted than in the invention of devices to
comply with the letter, but do violence to the spirit and thwart
the beneficient objects and purposes of laws designed to sup-
press the vice of gambling. Be it said to the expounders of the
law that such fruits of inventive genius have been allowed by
the courts to accomplish no greater result than that of demon-
strating the inaccuracy and insufficiency of some of the old
definitions of gambling that were made before the advent of the
era of greatly expanded, diversified, and cunning inventions."
IV. THE "FREE REPLAY" LOOPHOLE
The evolution of pinball machines designed to remain effective
gambling apparatus, and yet evade the sanction of the law has today
reached the stage of the free replay payoff. Since statutory and de-
cisional law had banned almost uniformly any tangible prize,4 9 but
statutes generally had not detailed whether or not an additional privi-
lege of operation was included therein,5 0 it appeared that the free
45 It appears that whether the tangible award is dispensed by the machine's me-
chanism, or by actual pay-offs on a non-payout device, the sanction attaches
equally. Cf. Hightower v. State, 156 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), where
the court held that the illegality of the device hinged upon the nature of the
actual use of the machine.
4C See e.g.: State v. Jaskie, 245 Wis. 398, 14 N.W.2d 148 (1944), actual payment
in money to player; Mills v. Browning, 59 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933),
tokens redeemed for money; State ex rel. Dussault v. Kilburn, 111 Mont. 400,
109 P.2d 1113 (1941), tokens redeemable in merchandise or additional games
discharged by the machine; Kraus v. Cleveland, 135 Ohio St. 43, 19 N.E.2d
159 (1939), machine discharged tokens usable only for a replay; Urban's Ap-
peal, 148 Pa. Super. 101, 24 A.2d 756 (1942), free games won actually redeemed
for money. But see: Boies v. Bartell, note 4 supra, where the Arizona statute
is construed to be limited to tokens or value in the form of money, and playing
for other tangible goods is not offensive; TENN. CODE ANN. §39-2033
(2,4) (Heartly Supp. 1957), which seems to allow tangible prizes on pinball
machines.
47, See People v. Gravenhorst, 32 N.Y.S.2d 760 (N.Y. Ct. Spl. Sess. 1942).
48 169 Mo. App. 682, 155 S.W. 842 (1913).
49 See note 46 supra.
50 Until quite recently statutes were ambiguous as to the status of the free replay
as a prize. Today, although various states have directly included additional
operation as a prize, the majority of jurisdictions have had to rely upon de
cisional law for determination of the replay's status in that particular state.
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game would escape condemnation. In People v. Gravenhorst,"' the in-
teraction of attempts to evade the purpose of anti-gambling laws, and
remedial legislation is set out as the typical background for the emer-
gence of the replay, a substitute prize:
"The type of machine which first met the condemnation of
our courts was one in which the player by inserting a coin had
the chance either of losing the amount played, or securing, as a
gain, other coins in varying denominations, the payment being in
actual money. . . .An obvious effort to nullify the effects of
the above [condemnation] was presented when the slot machine
interests eliminated pay-offs in money and substituted therefor
the return to the successful player of additional merchandise,
slugs or tokens, the latter being exchangeable for gum, mints,
cigars, etc. Machines of this type were likewise condemned.
* . . To avoid judicial disapprobation which the element of
chance brought down upon these contrivances, the manufacturers
proceeded to introduce a device to indicate in advance of play
exactly what the pay-off would be. The court held this sub-
terfuge unavailing, remarking that the player gambles not so
much on the immediate return, but on the expectation that the
indicator will show an opportunity for profit on his next play.
....,In their ceaseless endeavors to circumvent legislative and
judicial condemnation, the contrivers next developed a machine
resembling a cash register with a lever on the side, and in the
front, a column of packages of mints. Upon the deposit of a
coin and the operatoin of a lever a package of mints was re-
leased. In addition the machine caused three cylinders to re-
volve at different rates of speed. Upon each cylinder were
certain symbols and an incomplete sentence. The inscriptions
of the three, however, when read together, formed complete
sentences of a humorous vein. These machines sometimes de-
livered metal tokens which were purported to have no cash or
trade in value, and to be capable of use only for further amuse-
ment. These types of machines were declared illegal in numerous
state and Federal decisions .... The next development in these
machines . .. are known as the pinball type of slot machine.
... As an added inducement to the playing of these devices, a
mechanism is inserted whereby the operator on attaining a cer-
tain score, would be entitled to one or more free games which
were automatically furnished."52
This latest effort by the pinball industry, it will be seen, has been
successful at least partially 53 in avoiding disapproval of a machine
5132 N.Y. 2d 760, (N.Y. Ct. Spl. Sess. 1942). This case held that the free play
was a "thing of value" within statutory coverage.
52 Today, New York explicitly includes the free replay as a prize, and hence such
machines are within the condemnation of its anti-gambling laws. N.Y. PEN.
LAW §982 subd. 1 (a-b), 2. (1953), forbids a game of chance played for
"additional chance or right to use such machine." Case law has further re-
inforced this position against free play pinball devices by holding that if the
machine is even readily convertible into a free replay pinball, it is illegal.
Seaboard N.Y. Corp. v. Wallander, 192 Misc. 227, 80 N.Y.S.2d 715 (19 ).
53Recent statutes specifically exempting the free replay pinball machine from
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offering more than a quid pro quo for the consideration; however, it
has also been responsible for a sharp conflict of opinion among the
various states as to the illegality of a free replay machine as a gambling
device.54 The trend, until quite recently,55 seems to have been toward
more liberality in regard to this type of game, both by the courts5 and
by the legislatures.
5 7
To understand the division of authority on this point, it is necessary
to perceive the divergent rationale behind the decisions on either side.
Factors complicating the issue are the considerations as to what type
of statute is involved, what type of free play system is used, and even
to the personality of the player,58 in some instances.
Categorizing the various statutes, there appear to be three main
classes: (1) the general, ambiguous acts which leave the courts without
guidance in determining whether a particular machine is included as
illegal,5 9 (2) those containing partial definitions of what will constitute
condemnation under the anti-gambling laws are: California in a 1950 amend-
ment, CAL. PEN. CODE §330b (4) (Deering Supp. 1957); Illinois in a 1953
amendment, ILL. ANN. STAT. §342 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1957); Indiana in a
1955 amendment, IND. STAT. ANN. §10-2330 (Burns 1956); Massachusetts
in a 1949 amendment, MASS. ANN. LAWS c.140 §177A (1956); Tennessee in
a 1957 amendment, TENN. CODE ANN. §39-2033 (2) (4) (Heartly Supp.
1957). For illustrations of case law holding that the additional play machine
is not within the statutory test of "property" or "thing of value", see, e.g.,
respectively: State v. One "Jack and Jill" Pinball Machine, 224 S.W.2d 854
(Mo. App. 1949); Crystal Amusement Corp. v. Northrup, 19 Conn. Supp. 498,
118 A.2d 467 (1955).
5 Crystal Amusement Corp. v. Northrup, supra note 53; McNeice v. City of
Minneapolis, - Minn. - , 84 N.W. 2d 232 (Minn. 1957), expressing
legality of the free play machine. But cf. Westerhaus Co. v. City of Cincin-
nati, 165 Ohio St. 327, 135 N.E. 2d 318 (1956) ; State v. Paul, 43 N.J. Super.
396, 128 A.2d 737 (1957), finding the same machines unlawful.
55 The current Senate Hearings on improper activities in the labor and manage-
ment field, Hearings, supra note 16, disclosing the crime and graft connected
with the free replay devices, seem to have had the effect of restraining any
further liberal tendencies toward allowance of this type of machine. In Wis-
consin, a proposed amendment which would have permitted awarding the
additional play, was defeated finally on the day before the State Senate's ad-
journment, June 28, 1957. See note 27 supra. Also, the case of State v. Paul,
supra note 54, changed the law in New Jersey, which state had hitherto not
prohibited unrecorded free game machines. State v. Betti, 23 N.J.Misc. 169
(1945).
56 See e.g.: McNeice v. City of Minneapolis, - Minn. -, 84 N.W. 2d 232 (Minn.
1957), reversing an earlier opinion given by the State Attorney General, Op.
Atty. Gen. 733-D, December 12, 1955; Crystal Amusement Corp. v. Northrup,
19 Conn. Supp. 498, 118 A.2d 467 (1955).
57 See note 53 supra for statutes specifically allowing the free play device.
5s See State v. Sandfer, 93 Okla. Cr. 228, 226 P.2d 438 (1951), where the free
replay machine prohibited was in a school area; and the English case, Roberts
v. Harrison, 25 Times L.R. (Eng.) 700-Div. Ct., where the fact that the chief
participants in a free play game were boys from ten to seventeen years old,
influenced the outcome of the case.
59 See e.g.: MINN. STAT. ANN. §614.06 (1947), "Gambling with cards, dice,
gaming tables, or any other gambling device whatever is hereby prohibited.";
W. VA. CODE §60-10-1 (1951), "Any person who shall keep or exhibit a
gambling table, . . . or any other gambling table or device of like kind, ..
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
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a gambling machine, but which still need clarification when the "free
play" devices are encountered,60 (3) statutes expressly stating that the
free replay pinball machines are embraced within the anti-gambling
laws61 or are excluded therefrom. 62
Relatively few jurisdictions today have retained the vague and
indefinite type of anti-gambling legislation which typifies the old wide-
sweeping statutory condemnations of the vice of gambling. Due to the
difficulty of application in specific cases, 63 and the incongruous result
of sometimes ostensibly defeating the legislative intent behind these
laws, 64 remedial modifications effected in the bulk of the states have
extended their statutes so as to cover contemporary gambling problems
more specifically.65 The interpretations of the general form of gambling
suppression still in use in a diminishing number of states, appears to
favor the view that the free replay device is not within the contem-
plation of their laws. A 1957 Minnesota case,6G in determining that a
pinball machine offering additional plays for a high score was not
barred by a statute declaring "Gambling with cards, dice, gaming tables,
or any other gambling device whatever, is prohibited." [This writer's
italics] ,67 showed that its court was of the persuasion that the majority
rule excluded such devices.68 More strict yet was the construction that
60 Where the statutes use the "property" or "thing of value" test, the question is
whether or not a free replay is within this type of gambling device definition.
61 N.Y. PEN. LAW §982 subd. 1 (a-b), 2. (1953) forbids a game of chance played
for "money, thing of value, or additional chance or right to use such ma-
chine...".62 See note 53 supra.
63 The interpretation that the Minnesota court gave to its rather general anti-
gaming statute, when faced with an extra game machine, was based upon the
idea that a free replay was not property or a thing of value, although the
statute makes no mention of such criteria as determinative of legality in that
state. MINN. STAT. ANN. §614.06 (1947); McNeice v. City of Minneapolis,
- Minn. - , 84 N.W.2d 232 (Minn. 1957).
64In State v. Calandras, W. Va. 86 S.E.2d 242 (1955), the court felt that a
slot machine, upon which actual pay-offs were made, was not unlawful as
a gambling device because it was not a "device of like kind" to those spe-
cifically elicited in an earlier clause of the statute. W. VA. CODE §60-10-1(1951). It seems the court was giving the restrictive doctrine of ejusdem
generis a pointed application here, as well as the idea of strictly construing
gambling legislation.
65 Some statutes now use the "thing of value" test, see note 42 supra; some are
very precise in stating a permission or allowance of the free play type of ma-
chine, see note 53 supra. The Virginia statute, VA. CODE §18-292 (1950), in
barring free replay machines, exemplifies a well-drafted law; it states that a
gambling device is one by which: ". . . the user (a) may become entitled to
receive any piece of money, credit, allowance, or thing of value, or any check,
token, or memorandum, whether of value or otherwise, which may be ex-
changed for any money, credit, allowance, or thing of value, or which may be
given in trade; or (b) may secure additional chances or rights to use such
machine, apparatus, or device..05 84 N.W.2d 232 (Minn. 1957).
67 MINN. STAT. ANN. §614.06 (1947).
68 Stating that the majority holding was that where free replay pinball devices
were not mentioned, the free replay was neither property nor a thing of value,
the court apears to use these tests, although they do not appear in the pertinent
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the court in a West Virginia case6 9 gave to that state's section :70
"Any person who shall keep or exhibit a gambling table,
commonly called A.B.C. or E.O. table, or faro bank, or keno
table, or any other gambling table or device of like kind . . . or
concerned in interest [therein] . . . shall be guilty of mis-
demeanor." [Emphasis supplied.]
In finding that a "free play" type of slot machine, upon which actual
pay-outs in money had been made was not a gambling device under
the statute, it was stated:71
"The evidence however, does not establish that the device
was an 'A.B.C. or E.O. table, or faro bank, or keno table, or
any other gambling table or device of like kind'. The device in
question is referred to in the testimony as being similar to a
'slot machine' or 'one armed bandit', but we cannot assume that
such devices are of 'like kind' to those named in the statute.
The mere fact that the device could possibly be used or adapted
to gambling does not make it of 'like kind'. The burden was on
the State to establish that the table or device involved in this pro-
ceeding was one condemned by the statute. This, we think, it
did not do."72
The obvious inadequacy of such broadly expressed prohibitions points
up the need for legislative revision, establishing a more fixed and
reliable standard for the determination of gambling devices.
It is particularly within the second class of gaming laws that the
abrupt, diametrically opposite conclusions have been reached respect-
ing the legality of the free play device; such conflicts occurring often
under statutes basically identical. Since the vast majority of the states'
statutes are contained in this category, the resultant split of authority
where legislative provisions partially assist the courts, but are not pre-
cise in reference to pinball machines, especially the free replay variety,
should be examined in detail.
A small segment of states in this second group, whose statutes use
only the "game of chance '2 73 test without requiring a prize of any kind,
have held this type of mahcine to be a gambling device.7 - This seems
to be in accord with the general rule, supra7 5 determining all pinball
machines to be games of chance rather than of skill. However the
statute. However, the presumed legislative intent seems to be given much
weight here, and the decision rests principally on both these bases.
69 See note 64 supra.
-0W. VA. CODE §60-10-1 (1951).
71 See note 64 supra.
72 Contrast the reasoning here with that expressed in Stanley v. State, 194 Ark.
483, 107 S.W.2d 532 (1937) ; Alexander v. Hunnicutt, 196 S.C. 364, 13 S.E.2d
630 (1941), where very severe attitudes against pinball machihes offering no
prizes at all are evinced.
•3ALA. CODE tit.14 §283(d), (1940); MICH. STAT. ANN. §28.535 (1954).
7 See e.g., Club 400 v. State ex rel. Thetford, 78 So2d 819 (Ala. App. 1955);
Oatman v. Davidson, 310 Mich. 57, 16 N.W.2d 665 (1945).
See note 37 supra.
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marked disparity of interpretation occurs under those statutes which
do include the award element in their definition, but take opposite
stands upon the question of whether or not the free replay constitutes
such prize. Where the laws forbid pinball devices paying out "money
or property",", it is apparent that the additional play does not con-
stitute "money", 7  and the "property" test remains the criterion. Both
the State- and the Federal 9 courts today support the view that free
games do not constitute property within the meaning of such statutes.
What the property test encompasses, and that the free play benefit is
not therein included, was clearly stated by the court in Washington
Coin Machine Assn. v. Callahan :80
"The term property as used in the anti-gambling statutes
included goods, chattels, effects, evidences of rights in action,
and all written instruments by which any pecuniary obligation,
or money, or right or title to property, real or personal is created
or transferred; but none of such terms should be expanded to
include a free amusement feature, such as the privilege of play-
ing an additional free game if a certain score is made."
In spite of the authority contra, s6me states by enlargement of property
theories,81 and without abadoning an apparently obsolete definition,
8 2
have managed to include the free play within the term.
Those statutes condemning gambling apparatus upon which a re-
ward of a "thing of value", 83 "representative of value", 4 or "valuable
thing"' 5 may be won, have plunged the courts into a hardly insignificant
conflict in this area. A majority of the state courts are faced with this
test,86 and the different outcome of the cases under similar circum-
stances can only be explained in the light of the court's rationale in a
particular jurisdiction. While it would appear that the greater number
of states are inclined to follow the view that a "thing of value" does
76 See note 41 supra.
77 See e.g., Stoutamire v. Pratt, 148 Fla. 960, 5 So.2d 248 (1941).
78 See e.g.: State v. One Bally Coney Island No. 21011 Gambling Device, 174
Kan. 757, 258 P.2d 225 (1953) ; State v. One "Jack and Jill" Pinball Machine,
224 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. App. 1949). Contra, Baedaro v. Caldwell, 156 Neb. 489,
56 N.W.2d 706 (1953).
79 See e.g., Washington Coin Machine Assn. v. Callahan, 142 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir.
1944).
80 See note 79 supra.
81 Baedaro v. Caldwell, 156 Neb. 489, 56 N.W.2d 706 (1953) ; Middlemas v. Strutz,
71 N.D. 186, 299 N.W. 589 (1941); State v. Sandfer, 93 Okla. Cr. 228, 226
P.2d 438 (1951); State v. Larrimore, 293 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
82 The term "property" should be strictly construed in its legal sense, and not
stretched so as to fulfill legislative intent; it seems that statutory revision is
demanded. However, in many such revisions, the old "money or property"
definitions have been amended to the more popular "thing of value" term, and
while this term is more applicable in the realm of free game machines, there
are still problems of interpretation.
83 See e.g., OHIO REV. CODE c.29 §2915.15 (Page 1954).
84 See e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-432 (1956).
85 See e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. §2190 (1942).
86 See note 42 supra.
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include the free replay, 7 their reasons vary, and an ever-stronger
minority has challenged the former rule. Perhaps the explanation of
the failure of the minority view here to prevail over the other, is that
often where conflicts arose, legislative revision determined specifically
the status of the free play type machine. 88
A recent Ohio case, Westerhaus v. City of Cincinnati,9 summarizes
the opinions of many states9" which hold the free replay game a suffi-
cient "thing of value" on the basis of extra amusement:
"Amusement is a thing of value. Were it not so, it would
not be commercialized. The less amusement one receives, the
less value he receives; and the more amusement, the more value
he receives. Whoever plays the device and obtains tokens91
therefrom, receives more value for his nickels, with respect to
the amount of amusemnet obtained, than the player who re-
ceives none at all, . . . the greater the amount of amusement
received, the more valuable the prize. The minimum amount
of amusement offered in each play is that which is offered with-
out any return of tokens. Whatever amusement is offered
through the return of tokens92 is added amusement which a
player has an uncertain chance of receiving. This added amount
of amusement, the procurement of which is dependent wholly
upon chance, is a thing of value....
"Since amusement has value, and added amusement has
additional value, and since it is subject to be procured by chance
without the payment of additional consideration therefor, there
is involved in the game three elements of gambling, namely,
chance, price, and a prize." [This writer's italics.]
This well-reasoned explanation has been complemented by another
theory under which the free game device has been disapproved; the
latter having more noticeable social policy overtones. Jurisdictions
sharing this view that an extra opportunity to play the pinball machine
is a "thing of value", because anything which affords the necessary
lure to indulge the gambling instinct 93 fulfills that requirement, appear
s5 See e.g., Westerhaus Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 165 Ohio St. 327, 135 N.W.2d
318 (1956) ; Holliday v. Governor of State of South Carolina, 78 F.Supp. 918,
(D.C. S.C. 1948), aff'd 335 U.S. 803; State v. Bally Beach Club Pinball
Machine, 119 Vt. 123, 119 A.2d 876 (1956) ; City of Milwaukee v. Burns, 225
Wis. 296, 38 N.W.2d 700 (1937).
88 See note 53 supra.
s9 165 Ohio St. 327, 135 N.W.2d 318 (1956).
90 See note 87 supra.
91 The court was quoting with approval an earlier Ohio case, Kraus v. Cleveland,
135 Ohio St. 43, 19 N.E.2d 159 (1939), which involved a machine issuing tokens
for free replays. However, in the principal case, the additional game was
awarded automatically by the machine upon player's pushing button, and ex-
cept for this difference, the reasoning is applicable as well here.
9-Ibid.
93 See e.g.: Hunter v. Mayor and Council of Teaneck Tp., 128 N.J.L. 164, 24 A.2d
553 (1942) ; Holliday v. Governor of State of South Carolina, 78 F.Supp. 918
(S.C. 1948), aff'd 335 U.S. 803; Painter v. State, 163 Tenn. 627, 455 S.W.
46 (1932).
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to be liberalizing, by interpretation, their anti-gambling laws94 in order
to effectuate and promote the public policy behind them.95 The justi-
fication for thus denouncing machines awarding free games was aptly
set forth in People v. Cerniglia,6 where the court stated that it would
not be misled
"... by the apparent harmlessness of awarding free games,
inasmuch as that is an incentive that fosters the gambling spirit,
and that the element of chance is always present in respect to
these machines, and combining the element of chance with the
inducement of receiving something for nothing results in
gambling."
These two modes of regarding the free replay. as within the censure
of statutes using the "thing of value" test have, although representing
the weight of authority, been resisted in states using substantially the
same definition of prize. Arizona has indicated . that the expression
'representative of value" is limited to tokens representing money or
value in the form of money; 97 while cases in Connecticut98 and Penn-
sylvania 99 have treated the additional game as only trivial amusement,
not includible as the element of award necessary to the illegality of a
gambling device. Many other states which also had construed free
games to be without the "thing of value" concept, have since amended
their statutes to specifically exempt such type machines from operation
of their gambling laws. 100
Another statutory definition of a gambling machine uses the "uni-
form and fair return" test as determinative of a prize.101 Although
this standard effectively bars the free replay because of the uncertain-
ness intrinsic in that machine, it does not explicitly refer to the extra
game situation, as do many legislative revisions. The idea of a uniform
94 Anti-gambling statutes, as penal laws, should be strictly construed; however,
where legislative intent is evidently contra, or when the courts feel that it
would limit the meaning of a word or phrase in the gaming statute, so as to
defeat the law, then the strict interpretation doctrine, and the rule of ejusdem
generis will not be followed. Von Pelt v. State, 193 Tenn. 463, 246 S.W.2d
87 (1952).
95 See note 15 supra.
96 170 Misc. 631, 11 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1939).
97 Boies v. Bartell, 82 Ariz. 217, 310 P.2d 834 (1957). Under this interpretation,
a prize of merchandise would be legal.
98Crystal Amusement Corp. v. Northrup, 19 Conn. Supp. 498, 118 A.2d 646
(1955); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§8655, 8656 (1949).
99 it re Wigton, 151 Pa. Super. 337, 30 A.2d 352 (1943) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit.18
§§4603, 4605 (Purdon 1945).
:o0 See e.g.: Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. §342 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1957); Indiana,
IND. STAT. ANN. §10-2330 (Burns 1956); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN.
§39-2033 (2) (4), (Heartly Supp. 1957).
101 See e.g., S.C. CODE §§1301, 1301-1(2), (1942). Under South Carolina law,
any machine not giving uniform and fair return in value for each coin de-
posited, and in which there is any element of chance, is a gambling device, as
tending to promote and encourage the gambling instinct. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§849.16 (1941), prohibits machines with an element of chance or unpredictable
outcome.
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and certain return for consideration is often expressed with the argu-
ment that any inducement to the gambling instinct is a "thing of
value",101 even though the statutes involved fail to mention any such
thought.
Anti-gambling laws and amendments which expressly state, in pre-
cise language, what the status of the free replay is in that particular
jurisdiction, are the most recent legislative development responding to
the problems raised by that device. A proportionately larger number
of states which have particularized the legal position of the free game
pinball machine have favored excluding it from illegality. 103 The
methods of approving this machine have taken the forms of deeming
the game one predominantly of skill,0 4 deeming it primarily amuse-
ment,105 presuming the free replay not a "thing of value",' excluding
it from general gambling laws where some skill is involved,'0 7 and the
ultra-liberality of excluding pinball machines generally from the effect
of the gaming statute.10 8 In spite of the fact that few legislatures'"
have felt the need to condemn the additional plays device specifically,
in those states which allow it a further differentiation is made upon
the method of awarding the free replay. In Indiana, for example,
although a 1955 amendment took automatically, mechanically awarded
free replay machines out of the effective anti-gambling statute, a
metered free play device was held subject to destruction as a gambling
machine. 10 A proposed 1957 amendment to the Wisconsin Criminal
Code would not have affected the illegality of a pinball machine record-
102 See note 93 supra.
103 See note 53 supra.
104 CAL. PEN. CODE §330b (4), (Deering 1957) ; here excluded from the defi-
nition of a slot machine or device are ".... pinball and other amusement ma-
chines or devices which are predominantly games of skill, whether affording
opportunity of additional chances of free plays or not."
105 MASS. ANN. LAWS c.140 §177A (1956).
106 IND. STAT. ANN. §10-2330 (Burns 1956), presumes an immediate, mechan-
ically conferred free replay to be without value.
10T ILL. ANN. STAT. §342 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1957). Under this statute the
pinball machine awarding the free replay must have its operation depend "in
part upon skill". How ridiculously easy this requirement is to satisfy in
Illinois is seen by the statement of the court in People v. One Mechanical
Device or Machine Designated as Bally Dude Ranch Serial No. C-2603, 9
Ill. App.2d 38, 132 N.E.2d 338 (1957) : "In a statute imposing a penalty
for operating a gambling device, and exempting from its operation coin op-
erated devices which, inter alia, depend 'in part' on skill of the player, 'in part'
does not mean a modicum, minimal amount, or scintilla of skill, but means
something about which one can reasonably either feel or talk, and still not
be feeling or talking about nothing or next to nothing."
10s TENN. CODE ANN. §39-2033 (2) (4), (Heartly Supp. 1957). It appears
that here the legislative intent was to remove all pinball games from con-
demnation, because the amendment as originally proposed exempted only ma-
chines offering an immediate right to a free replay, however this limiting
language was dropped before the passage of the general exemption in 1957.
109 See e.g., N.Y. PEN. LAW §982 subd. 1 (a-b), 2. 1953) ; VA. CODE §18-292
(1950).
110 Tinder v. Music Operating Inc., 142 N.E.2d 610 (Ind. 1957).
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ing free plays awarded by it."' These statutes specifying that an
"additional chance or right to use" the pinball satisfies the prize element
of a gambling device," 2 have without difficulty settled the free replay
question adversely to the slot machine interests."
3
The type of system used to reward the free replay won is also a
factor which appears to be determinative of its approval or disapproval.
Where free games have been actually redeemed for money, merchan-
dise, or in trade, it is manifest that the machine constitutes a forbidden
device, and the courts have, with uniformity, so held." 4 Similarly where
tokens are discharged by the machine, which are exchangeable for
money, merchandise, or for additional plays, the machines have met
condemnation." 5 Tokens awarded which are convertible only into free
games," 6 or can be used only for amusement on another game,"17 are
likewise sufficient to denote the device unlawful in a majority of the
courts."" However, when the replay privilege is automatically awarded
by the machine, the objection to a tangible prize 19 has been evaded,
and only the decisive distinction between unrecorded and metered or
recorded extra games remains. The object of this rather recent test,
applied where the free replay is permitted under general, 20 partially
definitive,' 21 or specific statutes'22 is to diminish the danger of actual
pay-offs made on the number of additional plays, by eliminating any
accurate registration of such to determine pay-off amounts. This
added precaution seems to recognize, of necessity, the inherent ten-
"dency and actual practice of using such devices for gambling purposes.
Still another consideration involved in the rationale of certain courts
which have faced the free replay type of pinball machine, is that of the
age and disposition of the principal players thereof. On the basis of
the minority' 2 3 of operators, and where such devices are within a school
area,24 courts have determined these machines undesirable and illegal.
"' See note 27, supra. The final amended bill which failed to get the senate's
concurrence, provided that the free replay sought to be permitted would be
automatically, immediately, awarded, without any recordation as to number
of pay-offs in free games.
12 See note 109 supra.
113 See e.g., People v. Blakeslee, 309 N.Y. 829, 130 N.E.2d 619 (1955).
114 See note 46 supra.
15 See e.g., State ex rel. Dussault v. Kilburn, 111 Mont. 400, 109 P.2d 1113 (1941).
116 See e.g., Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 135 Ohio St. 43, 19 N.E.2d 159 (1939).
"17 See e.g., Painter v. State, 163 Tenn. 627, 45 S.W.2d 46 (1932).
-18 See note 46 supra.
'19 Ibid.
120 See McNeice v. City of Minneapolis. 84 N.W.2d 232 (Minn. 1957).
2 See e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §577-11 (1955); State v. One "Jack and
Jill" Pinball Machine, 224 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. App. 1949).
122 See note 110 supra.
123 See Roberts v. Harrison, 25 Times L.R. (Eng.) 700-Div. Ct. (1909). The
court here found that boys between ten and seventeen used the machine prin-
cipally, and based the decision upon this age factor.
124 State v. Sandfer, 93 Okla. Cr. 228, 226 P.2d 438 (1951).
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This tendency to protect especially persons in their immature and for-
mative years stems from the social policy of extra-cautiousness in mat-
ters affecting minors. In coincidence with this factor, the "inducement"
or "lure" to the gambling instinct is found as additional argument for
the prohibition of the pinball machines in this category. 125
V. CONCLUSION
Although until quite recently there appeared to be a growing trend
toward approval of the free replay pinball machine, both under inter-
pretations of the "thing of value" standard, and statutory amend-
ments, the weight of authority today maintains the view that it is a
gambling device. The argument that amusement has "value" would
seem to be the most logical and reasonable basis for condemnation
under laws not particualrizing the status of the free play machine.
The somewhat strained conception of the "property" theory to include
this device, as well as the more liberal constructoin of anti-gambling
statutes for policy reasons directed toward the same purpose, could be
avoided by precise legislative terminology designating the legal status
of the free play machine. It is this author's opinion that currently there
is a tendency to revert to the idea of banning this sort of contrivance,126
which, it appears, is inspired by disclosures of the present McClellan
Committee of the Senate, 27 and by police opposition based upon actual
abuses closely connected with the device.
The social policy behind the anti-gambling laws opposes any means
of eliciting the gambling instinct in man so as to involve him in that
unproductive enterprise with its usual criminal connotations. This
policy would not be fulfilled if the free play were permitted to become
a substitute prize, albeit trivial, which could arouse that instinct, and
become a forerunner of gambling in a more substantial degree. It is
this writer's opinion, however, that psychologically, the deep-rooted
motivation to gambling cannot be completely stifled. Gambling has
existed to some degree throughout our history, in spite of various
prohibitory measures, and, practically, there appears to be slight chance
of stamping out gambling on pinball machines altogether, even though
the free replay would be eliminated.
Conceding that a certain amount of gambling will occur practically,
the curtailment of the vice by means of regulation of the pinball device,
it will be seen, at least discourages gambling to some extent by its
sanction, and makes impracticable organized gambling operations via
this machine. This alone would satisfy the public policy sufficiently to
justify prohibiting this type of machine.
125 See note 123 supra; the court also felt that the machine encouraged the
"spirit of gambling".
12G See note 55 supra.
127 Hearings, supra note 16.
[Vol. 42
COMMENTS
While it can be argued that by offering this limited gambling ar-
rangement, a lawful inducement for which to play, more serious and
substantial gambling might be reduced, practical experience has shown128
that not less, but very much more illegal gaming activity springs from
such relaxation of the strict prohibition of this mode of gambling.
Thus the prevailing view, that a free-replay machine is a gambling de-
vice, supported by the well-reasoned "value" theory, and by practical
as well as policy reasons, appears to be most efficacious in attaining the
desired result.
ROBERT J. URBAN
128 Ibid.
19581
